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The Long and Short of It: Are We Asking the Right 
Questions? 
Modern Portfolio Theory and Time Horizons 
 
Jim Hawley and Jon Lukomnik* 
The heavy shadow of modern portfolio theory (MPT) has had a 
massive impact on everything from market structure, investment 
philosophy, and investor behavior, to the research that examines those 
disciplines. Researchers believe that they are casting light onto investment 
issues (including, for this purpose, specifically investor time horizons), but 
generalized acceptance of MPT allows it to continue to darken what should 
be enlightened. 
As a result, we contend that investors and researchers (both 
practitioners and academics) focus on and measure the wrong time frames. 
MPT focuses investment activity towards alpha-seeking activity and index 
replication, rather than trying to improve beta. We use beta in this context 
to mean the risk and return of the market as a whole, not a specific stock’s 
volatility in relation to market volatility. Beta, which is the systemic or 
non-diversifiable risk of a portfolio, is widely regarded—wrongly—as 
exogenous and rarely impacted by portfolio investment. As a result, 
research into investor time horizons primarily examines trading time 
frames around security or asset selection whose purpose is to seek alpha 
and/or diversify idiosyncratic risk, rather than examine the time and level 
of exposure to beta, or to impact beta, even though that is more impactful 
and explanatory. In addition, investors tend towards thinking of 
themselves and acting as if they have shorter investment horizons than 
they do in reality, partially because of MPT’s (and the asset management 
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industry’s) focus on security selection and alpha-seeking, and partially 
because of systemic hyper-discounting.1 
The contextual argument is this: MPT, as practiced, views systemic 
risk and return (beta or in the jargon of the investor, “the market”) as 
exogenous to, and not impacted by, investor decisions and behavior, either 
by one market actor or by implication (though usually unwritten and 
typically not considered) groups of market actors. MPT accepts that some 
risks are systemic and non-diversifiable: Those are the risks that contribute 
to beta. Those risks can be financial (e.g., global financial crisis), 
environmental (e.g., climate change), or social (e.g., income inequality or 
political stability), but the focus of MPT is to create an efficient mean-
variance portfolio within that systematic risk framework by diversifying 
idiosyncratic risk (or as alpha seekers do, by seeking some idiosyncratic 
risks and avoiding others). The remaining systemic risk constitutes beta, 
and the investor is exposed to it. There is no consideration that investment 
decisions themselves—whether intentionally or accidentally—can affect 
systemic risk. 
It is a central point of our argument that while some risks are 
systemic and non-diversifiable, that does not suggest that they are immune 
from mitigation. They can be addressed in a number of ways, which we 
discuss below. Indeed, the fact that these risks are not diversifiable should 
increase the urgency and rationale of addressing them directly but not 
through directly buying and selling securities. 
Investors, in mainstream MPT thinking, either focus on the search 
for alpha or, in attempting to maximally diversify idiosyncratic risk, gain 
exposure to beta through passive investment. 
Contrary to that mainstream view, we assert that there are feedback 
loops between portfolio investment and the environmental, social, and 
financial systems;2 thus, investors can and do affect beta. However, 
researchers’ analyses rarely focus on how portfolio investment affects beta 
and focus even less frequently on the time to impact beta since 
traditionalists continue to view beta as exogenous to portfolio investment 
decisions. We suggest that this perspective has everything to do with the 
misunderstanding of investors’ actual time horizons. 
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Specifically, we make six relevant observations about MPT, which 
provide context for—and a direct challenge to—how we measure 
investors’ time horizons: 
1. MPT has become a victim of its own success given the 
institutional ownership revolution in the last forty years; 
2. Portfolio investment, whether active alpha-seeking or passive 
beta-matching, can impact systemic risk, changing beta. In other words, 
systemic risk (and therefore beta) is not exogenous to portfolio investment; 
3. Alpha and beta are not distinct and disjointed but intimately linked 
along a continuum of market recognition and acceptance. 
4. MPT has focused on alpha-seeking as a way to extract value, 
leading to increased short-term (i.e., “the long short”) trading activity, 
even though seeking a “better beta” might be a more impactful way to 
create value, both in terms of portfolio returns and the economy as a whole. 
Ironically, MPT has created the intellectual and practical framework for 
indexation, but as most indexes are capitalization-weighted-based, alpha-
seeking investors thus have a tendency to wag the passive beta dog; 
5. The alpha–beta dynamic tends to speed up time frames 
irrationally; 
6. The prior five observations lead us to a crucial observation: There 
is a need for better measures of time frames. Those metrics should be 
designed for a purpose rather than be a “one metric measures all” 
investment objective. They should be designed specifically to measure 
time horizons for alpha-seeking investors and beta-exposure investors and 
for measuring the time of the feedback loop between portfolio investment 
and beta. 
 
Observation 1: MPT and the Ownership Revolution 
 
Fundamentally, nothing less than an equity ownership revolution 
(and indeed an investing revolution across most all asset classes) has 
changed capital markets since the 1950s when Markowitz first developed 
MPT.3 Institutions owned about 8% of the U.S. equity market in the 
1950s.4 Today, they own more than 78% in the United States (and higher 
in some countries).5 This is a game changer. But MPT, investment’s 
guiding light, has not adequately understood the implications of the 
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radically changed market structure, which is somewhat a result of its 
success. Ironically, while indicative of MPT dominance, the concentration 
of ownership within large institutions has the seeds of proving central parts 
of MPT flawed. 
In a fragmented ownership market dominated by individual 
ownership, such as the one Markowitz observed in 1952, MPT functioned 
in a decentralized manner. A plethora of decision-makers made individual 
decisions about individual securities. There were no large index funds and 
no exchange-traded funds. There were few large investors at all. As a 
result, any systemic impacts of any specific investor’s investment 
decisions, or even a group of investors’ decisions, were imperceptible. Let 
us call this the gravity conundrum. You and I have a gravitational effect 
on the moon. When we walk across the room, we affect the moon’s orbit. 
But, with the possible exception of theoretical geophysicists, no one cares 
or notices. It is simply too small to measure or to even take into account. 
And, of course, various people are walking in various directions all over 
the world at any one time, largely canceling out each other’s tiny lunar 
impact. That was the equivalent of Markowitz’s world in 1952. No 
investor or group of investors was large enough to affect beta in an 
observable manner. 
Compare that to the current U.S. market with its huge concentration 
of institutional equity ownership. The top five owners of any individual 
company (e.g., BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, etc.) often own 
upwards of 15% of equity, while the top twenty-five institutions can own 
upwards of 50%.6 
 
Observation 2: Portfolio Investment: Whether Alpha-Seeking or 
Passive Beta-Matching Can Impact Systemic Risk, Thereby Changing 
Beta. 
 
As a result, there is a set of powerful institutions controlling a large 
portion of the market, unlike the decentralized market of Markowitz’s 
time. At the same time, MPT drives these owners’ investment decisions to 
become radically centralized, often resulting in de facto “super portfolios,” 
which result in the co-movement of numbers of portfolios in the same 
direction; they are linked by investment philosophy and technique (MPT) 
to respond similarly—if not identically—to various indicators and 
developments.7 
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As an example of how this occurs and the effects of the phenomenon, 
consider the growth of index funds, which now account for more than one 
third of the U.S. stock market by capitalization.8 Passive investing through 
index funds does not try to “beat the market” but to match it, at least as 
measured by popular indices such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000. 
Conceptually, MPT provides a powerful rationale for passive 
investing. Capitalization-weighted indices are supposed to represent the 
cumulative “wisdom” of “the market,” the result of thousands, or even 
millions, of independent investment decisions. This is, effectively, the 
efficient market hypothesis at work. 
It certainly is true that indexation and passive investing have brought 
material benefits to investors by allowing low-cost diversified exposure to 
what is, in theory, the market’s best estimate of the most efficient mean-
variance portfolio. But, indexation is also an important example of MPT 
not recognizing how investors’ decisions, amplified by the growth of large 
institutional investors and by MPT’s own institutional and ideological 
success, can affect beta. 
One of the dynamics of this nonrecognition is the super-portfolio 
phenomenon. Wurgler shows that indexed-based investing strategies and 
products have risen rapidly over the last few decades.9 However, the 
efficient market view, as MacKenzie puts it, seems to have created an 
anomaly itself as index members are subject to an evident mispricing. 
Indices have become so popular that their members’ price movements are 
not entirely due to new information around the underlying securities 
comprising the index (either individually or cumulatively); rather, the 
market demand for investing in the indices themselves can move them 
independently.10  
Wurgler counts two impacts that index inclusion brings for a stock. 
The first is initial inclusion impact; the second is the continuation in 
inclusion impact.11 The increase in price followed by the inclusion of a 
stock in a major index is not the result of new information about the stock’s 
value (fundamentals) but a result of index inclusion causing the increase 
in demand for that stock by investors. This impact is documented in 
several studies.12 
Wurgler argues that the mispricing is not limited to the time of 
inclusion. After inclusion stocks start co-moving with other index 
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participants, index members, resultantly, can start slowly drifting away 
from the rest of the market. This phenomenon has an important and real 
implication for the market. As fund managers face the pressure of 
evaluation based on a benchmark, or chasing an index return, the resultant 
growth in demand to include an index in their portfolio creates a feedback 
loop that exacerbates index members’ detachment from the rest of the 
market. Therefore, rather than be a representative of a market, an index (to 
the degree that it is adopted and mirrored by others) can become a super-
portfolio whose movement is not related to the fundamentals and, 
therefore, exposes its holders (and others) to an enormous systematic risk. 
Sullivan and Xiong also find that the growth of indexation has 
affected equity market risk: “Such trading commonality then gives way to 
a rise in systematic fluctuations in overall demand, which, in turn, leads to 
a fundamental impact on the overall market and investors’ portfolios. In 
short, the growth in trading of passively managed equity indices 
corresponds to a rise in systematic market risk.”13 
The super-portfolio effect affects non-index, or fundamental, active 
equity managers as well; they do not want to be left behind. Such managers 
often have tracking error targets; they seek returns within a predetermined 
performance range of the chosen index benchmark.14 To do that, they 
carefully understand their underweight and overweight stock selections 
relative to the index. While most understand that this means they often 
hold index component stocks as tracking error risk control mechanisms, 
few make the link back to MPT. These investors are not making 
fundamental decisions but are buying or selling merely to control risk 
against an index, which MPT theorizes is supposed to represent the 
wisdom of the market, which further amplifies Wurgler’s index effects and 
begins the cycle anew. 
In effect, MPT’s goal of an efficient mean-variance portfolio, 
combined with the underlying efficient market hypothesis and 
operationalized by the ability to create index funds, creates an MPT 
tautology: The capital linked to the index itself becomes the justification 
for the index being efficient, thus attracting more capital. 
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Other studies also support the idea that index inclusion in and of itself 
can have fundamental impacts, even beyond market price, on the 
individual companies that comprise the index. For instance, Appel, 
Gormley, and Keim demonstrate that index inclusion results in 
fundamental corporate governance changes at the company due to a 
change in share ownership to large, institutional investors, such as 
Vanguard and Blackrock, which have specific governance preferences.15 
Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner note that index inclusion can drive a 
reduction in research and development expenses at companies because 
new investors are perceived to have short-term horizons.16 
Of course, amidst all this index effect and price movement, the 
ultimate irony is that if everyone accepted MPT’s cogent argument for 
passive investment vehicles and the efficient market and indexed their 
investments, there would be no individual stock selection decisions and, 
therefore, no price discovery, leading to a frozen market with no price 
movement. Thankfully, even with one third of the market linked to 
indices,17 that remains a theoretical rather than a practical issue. But, it 
does suggest that the more there is a switch from individual decision-
makers creating mean-variance efficient portfolios to passive investors 
and super-portfolios effects, the less resistance there will be to the index 
effects. 
However, a more recent market development, the rise in popularity 
of exchange-traded funds (ETFs),18 demonstrates that this may not be that 
theoretical of a concern, at least in some niche parts of the market. While 
ETFs are technically a market structure, not an investment methodology 
or vehicle, the preponderance are passive, designed to track an index. 
While some track broad market indices, many track sector indices. Like 
the broad market indices, those sector indices are often capitalization-
weighted, consistent with MPT and the efficient market hypothesis. Many, 
if not most, of the investors in ETFs regard those indices as “the market” 
for that sector of the market, or at least as the metric that measures the risk 
and return of the beta of “the market.” But, as we know, ETFs do not track 
their underlying components under a number of conditions.19 
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The narrower investment universe represented by the sector indices 
means that the impact of investors’ portfolio decisions is less diluted. To 
put another way, the “index effect” is more noticeable; it functions as an 
index multiplier. As the ETF grows, relative to the index, the tension 
grows. Consider, for example, the recent decision by VanEck to change 
the index of its VanEck Junior Gold Miners ETF (GDXJ).20 From 2016 to 
2017, the ETF grew its assets from slightly more than $1 billion to $5.4 
billion. The index tracked focused on smaller gold mining stocks, but the 
rapid growth in assets meant it was unable to invest solely in the stocks in 
the index without falling afoul of various market regulations, such as the 
Canadian rules that would require it to make a takeover offer for a 
company if it owned more than 20% of its shares.21 The solution is to 
change the index to include larger capitalization companies.22 In this case, 
investors wanted the systemic risk of smaller gold mining stocks. But, by 
buying in bulk, they changed the ability to invest in smaller companies, 
forcing the ETF to go up the capitalization rankings, thereby changing the 
beta of the ETF. 
In sum, MPT provides the intellectual underpinning of indexation but 
never considers that widespread adoption of indexation could have 
systemic impacts. Most MPT practitioners and other analysts regard beta 
as exogenous; MPT theory just does not consider that portfolio 
investments and beta are linked into a feedback loop.23 Reality has no such 
constraints. 
 
Observation 3: Alpha and Beta Are Not Distinct and Disjoint but 
Are Intimately Linked Along a Continuum of Market Recognition and 
Acceptance. 
 
The logical extension of the idea that portfolio investments affect 
beta is that, contrary to accepted MPT precepts, alpha and beta are not 
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disjoint but rather a bit like conjoined twins: When one moves in certain 
ways, it can impact the other. It is a two-way street, symbiotic and 
dialectic. This conceptualization challenges MPT’s fundamental belief 
that beta is fixed and exogenous to a portfolio and that one can only create 
positive or negative alpha, as opposed to affecting the market’s beta. 
An important recent example of this is the attention paid to 
environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) factors in 
investing. Indeed, there has been significant attention paid by practitioners 
and academics as to whether alpha can be found in ESG factors.24 An 
increasing number of robust studies using a variety of datasets and 
methods suggest: Yes, it can be (using traditional MPT definitions).25 
Various uses of ESG factors, for example, from factor exposure tilts to 
short-term ESG momentum portfolios that focus on improvement in ESG 
ratings, have outperformed various traditional benchmarks in the last ten 
or so years.26 Recently, a number of influential studies focused on 
Sustainability Accountings Standard Board (SASB) defined materiality 
aspects of ESG for specific sectors and found potential fundamental 
reasons for this outperformance. For example, the cost of capital—
whether debt or equity—is lower for firms with strong materiality in E 
and/or S and/or G factors.27 “To the degree that real-world benefit enables 
such firms to outperform various benchmarks an ESG alpha may be 
embedded in their valuation.”28 In theory, this cost of capital advantage 
exists because it “is not widely recognized and may be ‘found’ by early 
movers.”29 
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SFZ6]; Emily Kaiser et al., The Role of the Corporation in Society: Implications for Investors, 
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24319.pdf&dt=fundPDFs [https://perma.cc/C2RT-XUMK]. 
28. James Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Alpha-Bet(a) Soup: What to Make of Alpha Seeking 
and ESG?, MEDIUM BLOG (Aug. 23, 2016), https://blog.insight360.io/the-alpha-bet-a-soup-what-to-
make-of-alpha-seeking-and-esg-5df59f272503 [https://perma.cc/727L-BRBA]. 
29. Id. 
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Ironically, traditional market theory suggests that the early-mover 
source of alpha will eventually be arbitraged away. 
 
Thus, while the cost of capital may provide a source of 
“alpha” for early adopters, over time it should become 
part of the systemic factors that determine the “beta” of 
the market. In other words, to the degree that over time 
ESG factor out-performance is recognized by the larger 
market alpha fades (it regresses to the mean), and ESG’s 
systemic impact becomes embedded in equity (and bond) 
pricing, meaning it becomes part of market beta.30 
 
At a minimum, it becomes recognized as a systemic risk or source of 
“alternative beta” much the same way that capitalization range (i.e., small 
cap v. large cap), style (i.e., value, growth), illiquidity, and other factors 
have moved from sources of alpha for those early adopters who recognized 
them, to systemic risk exposures as they have become widely recognized 
by the majority of investment capital.31 
Similarly, while we currently consider ESG-tilts (such as ESG 
“smart beta” strategies) and ESG-momentum strategies as sources of 
alpha, they are actually systemic. How soon until ESG factors are also 
considered systemic risks incorporated into beta, rather than non-systemic 
alpha generators? Likely sooner than later: “smart ESG beta” is 
transitional to ESG becoming embedded in the market. As the more than 
half a million internet citations for the phrases “alternative beta” and 
“smart beta” suggest, this realization is becoming widespread.32 Indeed, 
there is now an “ESG Beta Quality Fund” ETF,33 an early indication that 
this transformation from alpha to beta has already begun. 
The existence of “smart/alternative beta” or “factor” impact is a 
major challenge to the traditional framework of MPT, as it suggests that 
alpha and beta are intimately linked in a host of ways. One way to view 
beta is as the sum of market participants’ internalization of the expected 
returns and expected risks (and correlations) of all the securities in the 
marketplace. Therefore, the more the distinguishing factors of any security 
or set of securities are recognized by the participants, the more those 
factors become part of market beta. The less recognized, the more those 
factors can be considered alpha. Unless one postulates that market 
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 32. Google search performed on June 26, 2017. 
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participants all reach the same analytical conclusions instantaneously, and 
thus, the factor under analysis switches from alpha to beta instantaneously, 
then alpha and beta are actually on a continuum, with the point on the 
continuum determined by the amount of market capital that considers 
those factors. That continuum continuously changes over time, as those 
factors wax and wane in acceptance. 
Some practitioners do intuitively understand the feedback 
mechanisms between alpha and beta. These investors practice what we 
term “intentional beta activism” in an attempt to change the 
undiversifiable systemic risk of the market.34 
Remember the gravitational conundrum? Today’s investors are large 
enough to affect beta directly.35 
The New York City proxy access initiative demonstrates the 
gravitational force that a single large investor can have.36 Proxy access is 
a technical procedure that makes it easier and less costly for investors to 
place their nominees for a company’s board of directors directly onto the 
company’s election ballot, in certain circumstances.37 While that right 
exists in various forms as a matter of law in various jurisdictions, it does 
not in the United States.38 Proxy access in the United States must be 
adopted by each firm, and firms can legally refuse to do so.39 As a result, 
until very recently virtually no public companies allowed proxy access. 
However, in 2014, New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer, on behalf 
of the City’s pension funds with assets of some $175 billion, decided to 
change that and sponsored proxy proposals at seventy-five large U.S. 
public companies to force them to adopt proxy access.40 He followed up 
in 2015 and 2016 with more proposals and has announced that the 
                                                     
34. See James Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, RI Quarterly: Beyond Modern Portfolio Theory–How 
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campaign will continue this year.41 As of 2017, more than half of S&P 500 
companies have adopted proxy access, and most observers think the trend 
is for further adoptions and for proxy access to spread to smaller 
companies.42 The New York City proxy access initiative is an attempt at 
beta activism, changing market standards and therefore beta—not just 
changing a particular company. 
Even certain governance actions directed in a single firm or a small 
set of firms to improve governance (or E and S factors) may be beta 
activism if, as former CalPERS CEO Dale Hansen once said, it “moves 
the herd.”43 That is, the way you herd cattle is to move the outliers into the 
center, thereby changing the herd’s direction. For markets, the same holds: 
Beta activism can define acceptable behavior as well as what the market 
considers relevant (material) factors, as Hawley has discussed in several 
blogs.44 
The signaling effect of beta activism can even affect such sources of 
non-diversifiable systemic risk as political risk and regulation. Consider, 
for example, how CalPERS changed a nation’s financial regulation. In 
2002, the pension fund announced that the laws governing investment into 
the Philippines were not adequate and that it would therefore pull its 
investments in that country’s stock market.45 The Manila index declined 
3.3% in a day.46 The Philippine government sent a delegation to 
Sacramento to meet with CalPERS and within two years announced 
changes to its laws and regulations sufficient to reverse CalPERS’s 
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boycott decision.47 CalPERS directly affected the beta of the Philippine 
market, but also its systemic health. 
Looked at through that analytical lens, recent activity by various 
investors represents a plethora of attempts at beta activism and some at 
changing systemic risk, or put positively and normatively, improving 
system health. Some of the investors undertaking them are large enough 
to act on their own, such as the efforts of Larry Fink, CEO of Blackrock— 
the world’s largest investor, with $4.6 trillion under management—to 
encourage public companies to invest for long-term revenue and 
productivity growth.48 
It is not an accident that the examples above include two of the 
largest pension funds in the world and the largest asset manager. There are 
costs to beta activism and attempting to ensure system health. Those costs 
are borne by the investors taking action, but the benefits are market-wide 
(since they are systemic), leading some to eschew those efforts because of 
a “free rider” issue.49 Moreover, the gravitational conundrum suggests that 
more assets are more effective at affecting beta and systems. 
However, the free rider issue experienced by large beta activists can 
be, and is, partially offset as various types of coalitions composed of 
smaller investors are formed to lower the cost collective actions. Ceres in 
the United States and Hermes in the United Kingdom have long organized 
groups of smaller funds to act together, thereby both mobilizing funds that 
otherwise would not be able to act individually due to high costs.50 
Additionally, such coalitions reduce the free rider effects for the largest 
beta activist funds, but of course, come nowhere near eliminating them. 
Increasingly, institutional investors are coming to understand that to 
be an effective beta activist you need significant assets under management 
(either individually or collectively, as in the Hermes and Ceres examples), 
and the more the better. Thus, coalitions of some of the largest investors 
are also forming. At least in theory, that should minimize the cost to any 
individual institution, somewhat mitigating the free rider issue, while 
making the activism more effective. 
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For example, on January 31, 2017, sixteen large institutional 
investors—with $17 trillion in assets under management—launched an 
ambitious attempt at beta activism.51 These investors promulgated a 
combined corporate governance and stewardship code to take effect on 
January 1, 2018.52 The initial signatories included major asset managers 
(BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, Vanguard, and T. Rowe Price), 
asset owners (the California State Teachers’ Retirement System and the 
Florida State Board of Administration), and international institutions (GIC 
Private Limited [Singapore’s Sovereign Wealth Fund], PGGM [the second 
largest pension fund in the Netherlands], and Royal Bank of Canada).53 
Their intention to change beta is manifest; the second headline of the press 
release announced the group was “[u]nveil[ing] [a] Framework of Guiding 
Principles with Expectation of Long-Term Value Creation . . . .”54 
The Investor Stewardship Group largely focused on the “G” of ESG, 
but investor coalitions are not limited to only that focus. By contrast, Ceres 
is an investor-led coalition which works on the “E” to, in its words,  
 
engage and collaborate on environmental, social, and 
governance issues to advance leading investment 
practices, corporate engagement strategies and policy 
solutions through working groups and shared learning 
opportunities, such as webinars and events. Ceres works 
with investors specifically to better manage carbon, water 
and supply chain risks, and ramp up global investments in 
clean energy and sustainable food and water systems.55 
 
The need for large assets to move the market is manifest to Ceres; 
one of its initiatives involves an investor-led coalition, the Investor 
Network on Climate Risk, which features more than 130 institutional 
investors with more than $17 trillion in assets, all of whom have pledged 
to invest so as to affect the systemic risk of climate change.56 Some have 
created low-carbon index funds; others have clean tech portfolios, and still 
others engage with petrochemical companies over the risk of “stranded 
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assets” (carbon-based natural resources that may never be burned due to 
climate impact).57 Read in terms of beta, this means making the market 
recognize such factors as “material,” that is, necessary as value added for 
a sustainable low carbon economy.58 In some ways, that fits into the MPT 
construct as “new information,” but it is distinguished by being 
information provided by investors and by the investors themselves 
attempting to move markets through capital allocation. Such actions were 
symbiotically related to a series of downgrades of coal companies by 
Moody’s and Fitch in the fall of 2015.59 
Turning to temporal issues, none of these initiatives show any 
evidence of being time-limited. To the extent that they have time frames, 
they are linked to the liabilities the investors are trying to offset; pension 
funds have liabilities that are infinite if the fund remains open for 
enrollment. BlackRock has often stated that, as the largest asset manager 
in the world, it anticipates having market exposure forever,60 so the long-
term health of the system matters to it. The coalitions see themselves as 
trying to effect permanent change. The time horizon of any specific action 
can be limited, but the impact of this type of beta activism is forever, in 
that at least in theory, it seeks to change the systemic risk profile 
permanently. As we will discuss in Observation 4, below, alpha-seeking 
investors measuring relative returns over short periods appear to hyper-
discount future cash flows. Beta activists, however, appear to have a very 
low discount rate indeed. As permanent market participants with continual 
beta exposure, they see themselves benefiting from the changed systemic 
risk profile forever. Thus, we do not believe that the holding periods 
related to securities selection of these investors or groups of investors is at 
all relevant to their goal of achieving a better beta. 
While recent years have seen the partial beta activist mobilization of 
large mutual funds (in the United States), this is overwhelmingly to date a 
top-down activism, however important it is. At the level of many portfolio 
managers within these huge firms, seeking alpha and beating benchmarks 
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still drive strategies and actions. This is also the case with the creation of 
new ESG investment products, especially ETFs, which are typically 
constructed and measured against benchmarks that by definition aim to 
‘beat the market.’ The full integration of ESG into investment strategies 
needs to involve a clear recognition that beta activism offers longer term 
value creation than benchmarks to beat the market. 
 
Observation 4: MPT Has Focused on Alpha-Seeking as the Way to 
Create Value, Even Though Seeking a “Better Beta” Is More Impactful. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) May Be a Better Metric than Holding 
Periods and Turnover Rates. 
 
Our contention that investors can affect beta is largely heterodox. 
MPT emphasizes investors’ ability to seek alpha, not affect beta. Most 
investors and observers judge skill by focusing on return versus 
benchmark indices over various time periods; assets flow to managers who 
“beat” their indices.61 Consultants present asset owners (both institutional 
and retail) with reports showing their portfolio returns compared to 
benchmarks, sorted by asset class or styles of management, typically on a 
quarterly, one-, three-, and five-year basis. 
There is a double irony in MPT’s massive conceptual influence. The 
first, as above, is that while MPT provides the reasonable justification for 
passive indexation, it simultaneously provides justification for active 
managers to beat those indices and often on a very short-term metric (e.g., 
quarterly). There is of course a logic to this: price discovery is clearly 
essential to all markets. Yet, by maintaining the absolute separation of 
idiosyncratic and systemic risk, MPT a priori precludes consideration of 
beta activism, including much that is by its nature long(er)-term. 
The second, and we argue crucial, irony is that beta dwarfs alpha in 
terms of total return effect. Brinson, Hood, and Beebower suggest that 
more than 90% of the variation in return is explained by asset allocation, 
not security selection.62 However, since MPT postulates that beta is a 
given and cannot be affected by individual portfolio managers, it is logical 
that investors would focus on what they can affect, namely alpha—hence, 
the MPT alpha/beta paradox: MPT postulates that what you can affect 
matters less than what you can’t. 
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The focus on alpha rather than beta results in pressure on active 
managers to try to differentiate themselves through trading as a way to 
seek alpha different than, and more positive than, other competing 
managers. The measuring of returns versus indices over short-term periods 
means that differentiation can occur over periods as short as one calendar 
quarter.63 As one study demonstrated, the majority of money managers 
trade more than they intend, even though “they were aware that excessive 
turnover was potentially harmful to their clients.”64 “[E]xcessive trading 
may be caused by the don’t just sit there, do something imperative. That 
imperative states that portfolio managers and traders must do something 
to justify their existence and compensation, even when doing nothing 
might be the better choice.”65 
The result has been well-documented: We have become a nation of 
fairly short-term traders, rather than long-term investors, at least when it 
comes to the public equity market. According to The World Bank, the 
annual turnover of the U.S. public equity market increased from 19.6% in 
1976 to 154.8% in 2016,66 meaning that an average investor will turn over 
its portfolio entirely in less than eight months. Some would argue that data 
is inflated because of high-frequency trading, but even alternative 
measures of stock duration suggest that investors hold their specific 
portfolios for little more than a year.67 
What all these measures have in common is that they look at the rate 
of change of specific stocks within an investor’s portfolio. That is not 
surprising: Investigators are following the modus operandi of the industry 
when they focus on the time frame surrounding trades rather than market 
(beta) exposure over time. 
Such trading also affects cap-weighted indices. At first you would 
think that the growth in indexation is indicative of investors lengthening 
time horizons and focusing on beta exposure. Yes, the growth in 
indexation shows some material portion of the marketplace understands 
(and has decided to stop playing) the short-term, beat-some-benchmark 
game. Some proponents of MPT in fact argue this. However, looking 
through the index fund to its holdings—the individual company stocks—
reveals that the only difference between index fund trading and 
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fundamental investor trading is that the index funds trade on autopilot 
rather than by human or algorithmic decision-making. Their weightings 
(other than changes to the index constituents by the index provider) are the 
sum of the active, non-index, alpha-seeking market participants’ trades. 
Given the market pressure to trade, cap-weighted passive portfolios reflect 
this trading activity. There is a tendency for the alpha tail to wag the beta 
dog. 
Thus, the index investor is exposed to short-term, relative-return 
thinking via the index construction rules that reflect the market’s trading 
activity. Indeed, some have called capitalization-weighted indices covert 
“momentum” style vehicles, as a price gain for a stock (disproportionate 
to the rest of the index universe) increases its weight in the index.68 Cap-
weighted indices are, effectively, price takers. If (too many) price makers 
are short-term, then price takers/indices reflect this (and perhaps magnify 
it due to the index effect). The irony here is that dedicated long-term 
passive owners may own long-term, but do not determine or influence 
capitalization of what they own. Short-term alpha-seeking sets the 
parameters for these beta-trackers. From the market point of view, the 
index investment does not offset short-term (relative return alpha trading) 
but may, in fact, amplify it. 
If it is market exposure that determines the vast majority of return 
and risk, is the holding period of individual securities optimal in 
determining how time frame affects risk and return? In effect, holding 
periods (or their variants) measure the inputs into alpha-seeking activity 
or the turnover in a portfolio but not the time dimension of beta exposure. 
In fact, virtually all investors, whether alpha-seeking traders or beta-
tracking ones, have permanent exposure to beta.69 It does not matter if 
actively-managed mutual fund X has a one-day, one-month, or one-year 
average holding period. Whatever dollar value of stock is sold will soon 
be replaced with stock(s) that is bought. This series of sequential “alpha” 
trades results in permanent beta exposure. But, of course, flows into the 
fund will vary the amount of beta exposure as the individual account 
holders put money into, or take money out of, the market. So, the mutual 
fund may have effectively permanent beta exposure, but the individual 
investors will experience a variance in their beta exposure. 
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This is consistent with the academic and practitioner research that 
beta exposure for an investor is different than the beta of the market as 
typically measured. As long ago as 2004, Ilia Dichev noted that dollar-
weighted returns, which consider the timing of investment decisions, “are 
systemically lower than buy-and-hold returns.”70 That difference was 
1.3% annualized for NYSE/AMEX listed stocks from 1929–2002 and 
1.5% annualized for nineteen international stock markets from 1973– 
2004.71 Investors, it seems, tend to get in and out of the market, often at 
the wrong times. 
Notwithstanding that finding, asset management firms have 
commercialized “tactical asset allocation” products that attempt to time 
the market. Today, there are more than two-hundred long-only such funds 
in the United States, which try to time the market.72 
Thus far, the results have not demonstrated that “timing the market” 
is a winning investment strategy. Indeed, one study suggested that not a 
single one of the fifty-seven tactical asset allocation funds with a five-year 
record ended July 2016 outperformed a passive 60% stock/40% bond 
index.73 
Other studies have suggested that a “cash drag” might be a primary 
cause of why retail investors underperform mutual funds, which, in turn, 
underperform the market.74 On average, retail investors hold 24% of their 
portfolios in cash, and mutual funds hold 3.5% in cash. Cash, of course, 
decreases equity market exposure but has no effect on security selection. 
So, all other things being equal, cash would hinder returns in an up market 
and benefit investors in a down market. Perhaps what is needed is not the 
time horizon or holding period of a trade measure but a dollar-weighted 
holding period of underinvestment (or, in the case of a leveraged investor, 
overinvestment) metric. 
In other words, temporal measures need to be combined with a 
quantitative measure of “how much” is being affected by that time 
measure. What these studies suggest, when looked at cumulatively, is that 
at a minimum, we need to dollar-weight investors’ returns as well as the 
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benchmarks against which they are traditionally measured rather than just 
time-weight them. So, we need to include time, alpha-seeking activity, and 
beta impact. This moves us more towards a comparative Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) type of calculus than the traditional and simple time-
weighted-return-versus-benchmark comparison. 
There are investors who are exceptions to this semi-permanent 
exposure to beta. Hedge funds can short stocks or baskets of stocks or even 
the indices themselves, and so have variable exposure to beta. Indeed, 
gross and net market exposures are standard risk measures for hedge fund 
investors.75 Similarly, there are a series of long-flat indices that alternate 
between market-level beta exposure and zero beta by converting market 
securities to cash based on certain technical signals.76 
But, the vast majority of investors hold primarily, if not exclusively, 
long-only exposures, whether active or passive. The holding period that 
matters for them is not the average of their trades at any point in time, but 
the sum of their trades over time. Nonetheless, because of our MPT 
mindset and worldview, we measure time frames wrong; or, more exactly, 
we measure the wrong time frames. We measure them as holding periods 
for individual trades (the inputs to seeking alpha) rather than the duration 
of exposure to the market (beta) and with consideration of the amount of 
beta exposure and alpha effect. For most investors, there is a large 
difference between the duration of its beta exposure and the duration of its 
individual trades. The former is far more important to long-term return. 
Here is one other piece of evidence that the time frame of beta 
exposure matters much more than any investor’s holding period or ex-ante 
time horizon for a trade:  
 
Time  
Period 
(Rolling, 
1926-
2014) 
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Best 166.9 42.1 35.6 21.5 18.4 
Worst (69.1) (43.7) (19.4) (6.2) 1.2 
Total 
Spread 
236.0 85.8 55.0 27.7 17.2 
                                                     
75. See, e.g., Net Exposure, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/net-
exposure.asp [https://perma.cc/M75K-XH2V]. 
76. See, e.g., Morningstar Long Flat Commodity Index, MORNINGSTAR, http://www. 
morningstar.com/invglossary/morningstar-long-flat-commodity-index.aspx [https://perma.cc/D5RL-
Y88C]. 
2018] The Long and Short of It 469 
According to CRSP data, the best one-year U.S. stock market return 
was 166.9%; the unfortunate investor who picked the worst year would 
have lost 69.1%. The spread between those best and worst one-year 
periods was 236%. However, time dampens volatility. The spread between 
the best and worst three-, five-, ten-, and twenty-year rolling periods in 
terms of annualized returns was 85.8%, 55.0%, 27.7% and 17.2%. In fact, 
by the time you hold for twenty years, there is no possible time period in 
which you would have lost money (nominally).77 What the data suggests 
is not what was for most or even some investors but rather what it could 
have meant to hold for various time periods, which would mitigate 
“shorter” holding periods’ volatility. 
 
Observation 5: The Alpha–Beta Dynamic Tends to Speed Up Time 
Frames Irrationally. 
 
The preceding discussion sets the stage for our discussion of short- 
termism. Simply put, the alpha–beta dynamic tends to speed up time 
irrationally. 
Perhaps the focus on alpha-seeking investors’ trading could be 
acceptable if there were evidence that the trading adds value. But, alpha 
is, by definition, a zero-sum pursuit. Moreover, there is evidence that 
investors hyper-discount—the systematic over-discounting of future cash 
flows, or what Bank of England Chief Economist Andrew Haldane has 
identified as the (too) “short long.”78 Hyper-discounting combined with 
MPT’s incorrect view of holding periods contributes to investors 
(including “long-term” ones) having irrationally short-term horizons. 
Therefore, though they think of themselves as long-term investors, 
sequential investors add to the economic short-termism.  
Somewhat parallel with our idea that absolute-return benchmarking (or 
liability benchmarking) is better than relative-return benchmarking, 
Haldane writes:  
 
Imagine instead that an investor w[as] making choices 
based on average payback periods, rather than NPV. 
Under rational discounting, the project has a payback 
period of nine years. Under myopic discounting, the 
payback period rises to 15 years. An investor might now 
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think twice before investing their money, for their money 
is committed for almost twice as long.79 
 
Haldane presents two NPV examples using ‘rational discounting’ 
(x=1.00), myopic (between x=0.95 and x=0.90)80: 
 
 
The implications of these assumptions are stark: at an extreme, an 
NPV over fifty years falls from $56 to minus $11. Haldane’s point: the 
short long.81 As he notes, the market values cash flows that are five years 
away as if they were eight years away, and cash flows that are thirty years 
away are given no value by the market.82 
Hyper-discounting is the seasoning that makes an MPT stew of short-
termism even more so. Here is the recipe: Combine the focus on alpha-
seeking trading as a way to differentiate a track record and the hyper-
discounting of future cash flows in those trades. Allow those hyper-
discounted trades to determine the components and weightings of indices. 
Move lots of money into passive strategies that track those indices, which 
are, of course, calculated based off those hyper-discounted trades. Then 
emphasize tracking error against those indices so that even more money is 
linked to them. 
The effects impact far more than just the equity markets. They also 
influence the real economy and, perhaps, dampen the inputs into 
                                                     
 79. Id. 
80. Id. at 13.  
 81. Id. at 13–24. 
 82. Id. 
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productivity improvement, resulting in slower-than-possible economic 
growth. For example, Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner argue that inclusion 
in the popular Russell 2000 index causes companies to reduce long-term 
investments, such as research and development spending, to accommodate 
new, short-term-focused investors.83 
Over-discounting of the future can have very real effects. For 
example, the U.S. government uses a 3% discount rate on the social cost 
of carbon, resulting in an implied cost of carbon emissions of $36 a ton.84 
Decreasing the discount rate to 2.5% would hike the price to $56 a ton. By 
contrast, increasing the discount rate to 5% would reduce that cost to $11 
a ton. A member of the Trump environmental transition team has 
suggested 7%—a rate that suggests that we may have a dead planet in a 
millennium for about a dollar. 85  
We suggest that the idea that the long-run is a series of short-runs is 
an MPT failure, much the way that over-discounting the social cost of 
carbon will result in a system failure and the end of human dominance of 
the world, rather than a summation of the “normal” series of short-terms 
that precede it. 
To assume that the long-run is a series of short-runs—and that the 
current systemic risk context will remain in place and acceptable—
assumes that people act in responsible ways for the long-run to protect the 
essential systems that allow capital markets to function. Behavioral 
finance and other approaches have proved this empirically false. Indeed, 
MPT itself relies on arguing that idiosyncratic risk is managed via 
diversification and that investing has no impact on systemic risk. In turn, 
this suggests that market participants have no particular interest in either 
mitigating or exacerbating—or even affecting—systemic risk in any way 
at all. The inference is that systems will maintain. 
The global financial crisis suggests otherwise. Numerous analyses 
have suggested that a mass reduction in underwriting standards on 
individual loans (idiosyncratic risk) added up to a systemic risk over 
time.86 That is consistent with our view that alpha (related to idiosyncratic 
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risk) and beta (related to systemic risk) are not disjointed but rather points 
along a continuum, and actions designed to affect one can affect the other. 
If too few people think in terms of systems, each “short-run” period 
changes the systemic risk profile for the next “short-run” period. Perhaps 
this is not enough to notice if your investment horizon is six months. But, 
many people invest for retirement, perhaps over fifty years, and economic 
historians look at centuries. The system in which you invest for the first 
six-month period is unlikely to be anything like the system in which you 
invest for the 100th sixth-month period (witness the discussion of the U.S. 
public equity market in Markowitz’s time versus today, above).87 We 
argue that systems are somewhat path dependent, with the next evolution 
of the system dependent on its current state rather than somehow mean 
regressing to a normal or standard state. Put somewhat differently, the 
long-term is not simply additive short-term intervals, each of which is 
unrelated to the previous and the next. Rather, it is the linkages of various 
past and current events to future ones; for example, post-financial crisis 
discussions of tail risk clearly recognize this.88 
The focus on alpha and the measures of stock trading, such as holding 
periods, turnover, and duration, all fail to contemplate this dynamic. 
The heterodox views expressed above beg two questions: 
1. If alpha and beta are intertwined, beta is not immutable, and beta 
is more impactful on wealth generation than alpha, how should 
investors invest? 
2. If investors effectively have permanent exposure to beta, yet they 
over-discount the future of individual positions created by alpha-
seeking, how should they view their investment time horizon? 
The answer to both questions is that investors today need to be aware 
of risks and opportunities at the security level (alpha), market level (beta), 
and systems level. And they are beginning to do so. But, our current 
temporal measures assume that alpha-seeking is the dominant driver of 
investment decisions, despite the fact that beta has more impact on 
investment risk and return. 
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Observation 6, and Future Directions and Questions: There Is a 
Need for Better Measures of Time Frames. Those Metrics Should be 
Designed for Purpose Rather than Be a “One Metric Measures All.” 
 
Current metrics, such as holding period, stock duration, and turnover, 
are adequate to measure the time horizon for stock picking and to use in 
combination with other measures to suggest stock-picking skill as the key 
input to what is traditionally termed “alpha.” However, acknowledging the 
alpha–beta dynamic complicates the nature of the metrics needed to 
measure the time horizons of investment. 
Traditional temporal measures are not useful to illustrate the realities 
of today’s investment world, which is some combination of alpha-seeking, 
beta-matching, and alpha–beta feedback loops. For instance, holding 
period is not a helpful metric in understanding the duration of a series of 
sequential alpha trades resulting in quasi-permanent beta exposure. Nor do 
they illuminate the specific time periods of beta exposure created by those 
sequential trades that aggregate alpha-seeking trades into semi-permanent 
beta exposures. A time line of beta exposure and of cash drag might be a 
place to start. 
An even more difficult job will be to find temporal measures relative 
to the feedback loops between an investor’s, or group of investors’, 
portfolio investment and the resultant effect on beta, whether that effect is 
intentional or incidental. This type of question is an important element in 
the work of The Investment Integration Project, among others. 
Perhaps one idea to illuminate some aspects of the issue would be to 
infer an investor’s discount rate. Knowing that, it would be possible to 
back into the time horizon of investors not just for individual security 
trades but also for actions designed to affect beta. Such an inverted, 
inferred discount rate (IIDR) would have the advantage of being 
comparable across alpha-seeking, beta-matching, and beta-affecting 
investors and would suggest which investors or investment vehicles have 
shorter or longer term investment philosophies. It might also have a 
secondary, salutary effect by making discount rates explicit. If it is true 
that “what gets measured gets managed,” then such a metric would be a 
first step towards investors understanding, and then correcting, their 
tendency to hyper-discount, and could thereby counter the current “short 
long.” If combined with a dollar-weighted returns metric (as discussed 
above), these metrics begin to measure today’s complex investment 
strategies. 
Another likely complementary starting point would be development 
of multiple absolute metrics, as some factor investing strategies would 
imply. Such metrics would need to have both temporal and exposure axes. 
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The advantage of such metrics is that they can be temporal metrics of 
exposure not to just beta but also to factors, whether E, S, and G factors, 
or to more traditional factors (e.g., value, size, momentum, volatility, term, 
credit, and market (beta)).89 
Some or all of these new metrics likely have implications for current 
law and regulations in various jurisdictions. A discussion of what these 
might mean is beyond the scope of this Article, but a parallel with MPT is 
apt. As MPT came to the fore in both market practice and academic theory 
in the 1960s and 1970s, its impact was dramatically felt in the revisions of 
U.S. law and regulation, specifically in the formulations of the 1974 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),90 which focused 
on defining risk on a portfolio rather than an individual security basis. 
Future work will have to confront the challenges of developing both 
the concepts and practical metrics for such measurements, as well as what 
the legal and regulatory implications of such metrics are. Such a 
reconceptualization of metrics would not only confront the “short long” 
but would directly link the role of finance to what we consider its proper 
place: as an intermediary to rationally foster and facilitate non-financial 
capital investment, unaffected by either the blind spots of MPT or the 
tendency to hyper-discount long-term investment returns. 
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